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Abstract
We present here two logical systems - intuitionistic paraconsistent weak Kleene logic (IPWK) and para-
consistent pre-rough logic (PPRL) as examples of logics with some rules of inference that have variable
sharing restrictions imposed on them. These systems have the same set of theorems as intuitionistic
propositional logic and pre-rough logic, respectively, but are paraconsistent while the original systems
are not. We discuss algebraic semantics for these logics. A contaminating element, intended to denote a
state of indeterminacy, is used to extend each Heyting algebra and each pre-rough algebra. The classes of
these extended Heyting algebras and the extended pre-rough algebras form models of IPWK and PPRL,
respectively. We then prove the soundness and completeness results for these systems.
Keywords: Paraconsistency, Contamination, Intuitionistic logic, Heyting algebras, Pre-rough logic, Pre-
rough algebras.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Paraconsistency
A paraconsistent logic is a logic where an inconsistency does not entail triviality. In other words, a para-
consistent logic is a logic where it is not always possible to derive every statement or formula from an
inconsistency or contradiction. Thus paraconsistent logics are described as those which give rise to incon-
sistent but non-trivial theories, that is, sets of sentences closed under logical consequence. Classical logic,
and even some non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic logic, fail in this because of the so-called principle
of ‘explosion’, which says that for any formula α,
{α,¬α} ⊢ β,
where ¬α denotes ‘not’-α, ⊢ is the logical consequence relation and β is any formula, possibly unrelated
to α. This rule is also commonly known as ECQ or ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (Latin for “from a
contradiction, anything follows”). Under the presence of some widely accepted structural rules (see Definition
1.3), a logic is paraconsistent iff it is not explosive, that is ECQ fails in it [24].
Another principle linked with the study of paraconsistency is the law of non-contradiction, which states that
a formula α and its negation, ¬α cannot both be simultaneously true. Formally this means that for all
formulas α, α ∧ ¬α, where ∧ denotes conjunction, is false. In other words, ¬(α ∧ ¬α) is a theorem, that is,
⊢ ¬(α ∧ ¬α). Henceforth, in this paper, we will denote the formula ¬(α ∧ ¬α) by LNC.
Classical and intuitionistic logics are explosive and also have LNC as a theorem. However, there are logics,
such as the three-valued logic of  Lukasiewicz, where ECQ holds, but LNC is not a theorem. On the other
hand, there are also examples of logics, such as Priest’s Logic of Paradox LP, where ECQ fails but LNC is
a theorem.
It is clear from the above discussion that both negation and the logical consequence relation play important
roles in differentiating paraconsistent from non-paraconsistent logics. This issue is discussed at length in
[12]. The aforementioned paper also presents a list of some known paraconsistent systems and the properties
of negation and consequence in these. Paraconsistent logics belong to a larger class of inconsistency tolerant
logics. More about paraconsistency along with its history and motivations can be found in [25, 3, 21].
In the current paper, we present two logical systems - the intuitionistic paraconsistent weak Kleene logic
(IPWK) and the paraconsistent pre-rough logic (PPRL). The first one has the same set of theorems as
intuitionistic propositional logic, but is paraconsistent. However, we will see that LNC is a theorem of IPWK.
The paraconsistency of IPWK can be attributed to a restriction on the rule of inference on the syntactic
side. An algebraic interpretation of this logic is found in the class of algebras obtained by attaching an extra
element ω to each Heyting algebra. This element, which is intended to denote a state of ‘indeterminacy’, is
included as a designated truth-value along with the top element of a Heyting algebra. We then prove that
IPWK is sound and complete with respect to the class of these extended Heyting algebras (see Subsection
3.1).
The classical counterpart of this, that is, a logical system that has the same set of theorems as classical
propositional logic, is the well-known Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic (PWK), and is discussed in [5, 7, 8].
An algebraic interpretation of PWK is obtained by attaching an extra element to each Boolean algebra.
PWK is shown to be sound an complete with respect to the class of extended Boolean algebras in [5].
The second logical system, that we discuss in Subsection 3.2, has the same set of theorems as pre-rough logic
but is paraconsistent. In addition, we see that LNC is not a theorem of PPRL. The syntactic presentation
of this logic is obtained by restricting two of the rules of inference of pre-rough logic. As in the cases of the
logics PWK and IPWK, we obtain an algebraic interpretation of PPRL in the class of algebras obtained by
attaching an extra element to each pre-rough algebra and including this as a designated truth-value along
with the top element of a pre-rough algebra. We then prove that PPRL is sound and complete with respect
to the class of these extended pre-rough algebras.
We have also included a section (Subsection 1.2) on some abstract algebraic notations and terminology for
the readers’ sake.
The restrictions on the rules of inference seemingly play an important role in the development of these
paraconsistent systems. We have thus included a separate section for a discussion on these restricted rules
of inference in a general setting (see Section 2).
1.2 Algebraic preliminaries
In this subsection, we include some standard abstract algebraic notions that we will be using in the rest of
the paper. Everything in this subsection, and more, can be found in [14].
Definition 1.1. A logical language is a set of connectives/ logical operators, each with a fixed arity n ∈
N = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .}.
Definition 1.2. Given a logical language L and a countably infinite set V of propositional variables, the
formulas are defined inductively in the usual way. The connectives/ operators can be regarded as the
operation symbols of an algebraic similarity type and then the formulas are the terms of this similarity type
over the set V . We then obtain the algebra of terms, which is an absolutely free algebra, that is, a free
algebra without any relations, of type L over the countably infinite set of generators V [6, Chapter II, §10].
We call this the algebra of formulas and denote it by Fm. The underlying set of the algebra Fm is the set
of formulas, denoted by Fm. The operations of Fm are those that are used for forming complex formulas
and are associated with the operators in L.
The following definition is a variant of Tarski’s famous definition of a finitary consequence operator. [An
English translation of this paper from 1930 can be found in [29].]
Definition 1.3. Given a set A, a relation ⊢⊆ P(A)×A between subsets of A and elements of A is called a
consequence relation if it satisfies the following conditions.
(C1) For any X ⊆ A, if a ∈ X , then X ⊢ a. (Reflexivity)
(C2) For any X,Y ⊆ A, and b ∈ A if Y ⊢ a for all a ∈ X , and X ⊢ b, then Y ⊢ b. (Transitivity)
The above two conditions imply the following.
(C3) For any X,Y ⊆ A and a ∈ A, if X ⊢ a and X ⊆ Y , then Y ⊢ a. (Monotonicity)
 Los´ and Suszko, in 1958 [18], added the condition of invariance under substitutions to the Tarskian conditions.
This is detailed below.
Definition 1.4. Given an logical languageL and a set of variables V , a substitution is a function σ : V → Fm ,
which then extends to a unique endomorphism of the formula algebra Fm.
Definition 1.5. A consequence relation is called substitution-invariant provided it satisfies the following
condition in addition to (C1) and (C2), and hence also (C3), above.
(C4) For any substitution σ, any Σ ⊆ Fm , and any formula ϕ, if Σ ⊢ ϕ, then σ[Σ] ⊢ σ(ϕ). (Structurality)
Definition 1.6. Given a logical language L, a logic or deductive system in the language L is a pair S =
〈Fm,⊢S〉, where Fm is the algebra of formulas of type L and ⊢S is a substitution-invariant consequence
relation on Fm , that is, a relation ⊢S ⊆ P(Fm) × Fm satisfying the conditions (C1), (C2), and (C4), and
hence also (C3). Such a consequence relation is also called a syntactic consequence relation.
Lastly, we have a variant of one of Tarski’s original conditions.
Definition 1.7. A logic S is said to be finitary when its consequence relation satisfies the following additional
property.
(C5) For every Σ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm , if Σ ⊢S ϕ, then there exists a finite Σ′ ⊆ Σ such that Σ′ ⊢S ϕ.
The above property is also known as compactness.
The consequence relations of all logics in this paper will be assumed to have the properties (C1)–(C5), unless
otherwise stated.
Lastly, we mention the following concept which was introduced by  Lukasiewicz and Tarski in the 1920’s [an
English translation of their work detailing this, titled “Investigations into the sentential calculus” can be
found in [19]].
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Definition 1.8. A (logical) matrix for a logical language L, or an L-matrix, is an ordered pair 〈A, F 〉 where
A is an algebra of type L with universe A, and F ⊆ A; this set F is called the set of designated values.
Remark 1.9. In the above definition, it is possible that the set F of designated values is empty or equal to
A. However, in this paper, unless otherwise stated, we will assume that F 6= ∅ and F ( A.
Given a logical language L, and an L-matrix, each formula ϕ of L has a unique interpretation in A depending
on the values in A that are assigned to its variables. Then, using the facts that Fm is absolutely freely
generated from the set of variables and that A is an algebra over the same language, the interpretation of ϕ
can be expressed algebraically as v(ϕ), where v : Fm → A is a homomorphism that maps each variable of
ϕ to its assigned value in A.
Definition 1.10. A homomorphism whose domain is the formula algebra is called an assignment or valua-
tion.
We sometimes write a formula ϕ in the form ϕ(x0, . . . , xn−1) to indicate explicitly that the variables in ϕ
are among x0, . . . , xn−1, and ϕ
A(a0, . . . , an−1) for v(ϕ), where v is any valuation such that v(xi) = ai for all
0 ≤ i < n.
Definition 1.11. Given a logic S in a language L, an L-matrix 〈A, F 〉 is called a model of S if, for every
valuation v : Fm→ A and every Σ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm ,
if v[Σ] ⊆ F and Σ ⊢S ϕ then v(ϕ) ∈ F.
2 Restricted rules of inference
2.1 Restricted modus ponens
As mentioned earlier, the implication operator, ‘−→’, is central to the study of logic. An important rule
concerning implication is modus ponens (MP) or detachment or implication elimination, which allows us
to infer a sentence β from the sentences α and α −→ β. Thus in the language of the previous section, if
S = 〈Fm,⊢S〉 is a logic over a logical language L that includes −→, where MP is accepted as a rule, then for
any α, β ∈ Fm , {α, α −→ β} ⊢S β. Hence MP establishes a connect between the object language implication
and the meta-level consequence relation. So, much like the centrality of implication in the study of logic,
modus ponens is a crucial rule regarding implication.
However, there are logics where MP fails. A well known example is the Logic of Paradox (LP) [23]. Only
a restricted version of MP holds in the logic PWK [5], and the logics that we discuss in this paper. The
restricted modus ponens (RMP) rule can be formally stated as follows.
For any α, β ∈ Fm, {α, α −→ β} ⊢ β, provided var(α) ⊆ var(β),
where var(δ) denotes that set of propositional variables occurring in δ ∈ Fm. It may be noted here that the
restricted MP does not hold in LP.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose S = 〈Fm,⊢S〉 be a logic in the language L such that −→∈ L. Let 〈A, F 〉 be an
L-matrix, and A be the universe of the algebra A. Suppose ω ∈ F and every valuation v : Fm→ A satisfies
the following properties.
(i) For any α, β ∈ Fm , if v(α), v(α −→ β) ∈ F \ {ω}, then v(β) ∈ F \ {ω}.
(ii) For any δ ∈ Fm, v(δ) = ω iff v(p) = ω for some p ∈ var(δ).
Then for all α, β ∈ Fm and for any valuation v : Fm→ A, var(α) ⊆ var(β) and v(α), v(α −→ β) ∈ F imply
v(β) ∈ F .
Proof. Let α, β ∈ Fm with var(α) ⊆ var(β) and v : Fm→ A be a valuation such that v(α), v(α −→ β) ∈ F .
We consider the following cases.
Case 1: v(α), v(α −→ β) ∈ F \ {ω}
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In this case, v(β) ∈ F \ {ω} ⊆ F by the property (i) of valuations stated in the theorem.
Case 2: v(α) = ω and v(α −→ β) ∈ F \ {ω}
We note that v(α) = ω implies that there is a p ∈ var(α) such that v(p) = ω by the property (ii) of valuations
stated above. It then follows that p ∈ var(α −→ β) and hence v(α −→ β) = ω. This, however, goes against
our assumption and hence this case is not possible.
Case 3: v(α) ∈ F \ {ω} and v(α −→ β) = ω
In this case, we note that, since v(α −→ β) = ω, there is a p ∈ var(α −→ β) such that v(p) = ω. Clearly,
v(α −→ β) = var(α) ∪ var(β). However, if p ∈ var(α) then, by property (ii) of valuations stated above,
v(α) = ω. But we have assumed that v(α) 6= ω. Hence p ∈ var(β). This implies that v(β) = ω ∈ F .
Case 4: v(α) = ω = v(α −→ β)
We note that, since v(α) = ω, there is a variable p ∈ var(α) such that v(p) = ω, by property (ii) of valuations.
Now since var(α) ⊆ var(β), p ∈ var(β), and so v(β) = ω ∈ F , again by property (ii) of valuations.
Thus for any α, β ∈ Fm , and for any valuation v : Fm→ A, the condition var(α) ⊆ var(β) ensures that, if
v(α), v(α −→ β) ∈ F , then v(β) ∈ F .
Remark 2.2. The property (ii) of valuations in the above theorem has been described as contamination or
infectiousness in the literature and has been used to interpret a variety of phenomena that arise naturally in
domains such as linguistics, epistemology and computer science. We regard the contaminating element ω as
designating indeterminacy, which is definitely distinct from falsity. The truth value of a compound sentence
is then indeterminate if the truth value of any of its components is indeterminate. See [9, 10, 8] for more
detailed discussions on this.
Continuing in the same vein, we can say that the property (i) of valuations in the above theorem ensures
that unrestricted modus ponens holds for sentences that are not indeterminate.
A partial converse of Theorem 2.1 is established in the following result.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose S = 〈Fm,⊢S〉, L, and 〈A, F 〉 be as in Theorem 2.1. Suppose ω ∈ F and every
valuation into A satisfies the two conditions in Theorem 2.1. Then there exists α, β ∈ Fm with var(α) 6⊆
var(β) and a valuation v : Fm→ A such that v(α), v(α −→ β) ∈ F but v(β) /∈ F .
Proof. Suppose α = p and β = q, where p, q are distinct variables. Thus var(α) 6⊆ var(β).
Let v : Fm→ A be a valuation such that v(p) = ω while v(q) /∈ F .
Then, by property (ii) of valuations, v(α) = ω = v(α −→ β), but v(β) /∈ F .
Remark 2.4. A necessity result of the same spirit as above for PWK, in terms of the semantic consequence
relation, can be found in Section 3 of [7].
2.2 Restricted hypothetical syllogism
Hypothetical syllogism (HS) is another rule of inference that involves the implication operator. This rule
can be derived from the axioms and MP in classical and intuitionistic logic. Formally, if S = 〈Fm,⊢S〉 is a
logic over a logical language L that includes −→, where HS is an accepted rule, then for any α, β, γ ∈ Fm ,
{α −→ β, β −→ γ} ⊢S α −→ γ. The rule HS is also known as transitivity for the implication operator and
can be seen as a reflection of the rule (C2) for the consequence relation given in Definition 1.3.
There are logics, such as PWK, where HS fails [7]. However, it can be easily verified that a restricted version
of HS, that we discuss below, holds in PWK. The logics we discuss in this paper provide further examples
of such logics. The restricted hypothetical syllogism (RHS) rule can be formally stated as follows.
For any α, β, γ ∈ Fm, {α −→ β, β −→ γ} ⊢ α −→ γ, provided var(β) ⊆ var(α) ∪ var(γ).
Theorem 2.5. Suppose S = 〈Fm,⊢〉, L and 〈A, F 〉 be as in Theorem 2.1. Suppose ω ∈ F and every
valuation v : Fm→ A satisfies the following two properties.
(i) For any α, β, γ ∈ Fm, if v(α −→ β), v(β −→ γ) ∈ F \ {ω}, then v(α −→ γ) ∈ F \ {ω}.
(ii) For any δ ∈ Fm, v(δ) = ω iff v(p) = ω for some p ∈ var(δ). (This is same as in Theorem 2.1.)
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Then for all α, β, γ ∈ Fm and for any valuation v : Fm → A, var(β) ⊆ var(α) ∪ var(γ) and v(α −→
β), v(β −→ γ) ∈ F imply v(α −→ γ) ∈ F .
Proof. Let αβ, γ ∈ Fm with var(β) ⊆ var(α) ∪ var(γ) and v : Fm → A be a valuation such that v(α −→
β), v(β −→ γ) ∈ F . We consider the following cases.
Case 1: v(α −→ β) = ω and v(β −→ γ) ∈ F .
Since v(α −→ β) = ω, by the property (ii) of valuations stated in the theorem, there exists a variable
p ∈ var(α −→ β) = var(α) ∪ var(β) such that v(p) = ω.
If p ∈ var(α) then it follows that v(α −→ γ) = ω ∈ F . Else, p ∈ var(β) ⊆ var(α) ∪ var(γ), by assumption,
and hence v(α −→ γ) = ω ∈ F .
Case 2: Suppose v(β −→ γ) = ω and v(α −→ β) ∈ F .
This case is similar to Case 1 and using similar arguments as above, one can show that v(α −→ γ) = ω ∈ F .
Case 3: Suppose v(α −→ γ), v(β −→ γ) ∈ F \ {ω}.
In this case, v(α −→ γ) ∈ F \ {ω} ⊆ F , by property (i) of valuations.
Thus for any α, β, γ ∈ Fm , and for any valuation v : Fm → A satisfying the conditions (i) and (ii), the
restriction var(β) ⊆ var(α) ∪ var(γ) ensures that, if v(α −→ β), v(β −→ γ) ∈ F , then v(α −→ γ) ∈ F .
Remark 2.6. The variable-sharing restrictions imposed on MP and HS to obtain the rules RMP and RHS
are somewhat similar to the ones in Relevant logics. However, the logics discussed in this paper which use
RMP and RHS are not relevant logics, as will be evident in the following section.
We observe an interesting similarity between the rules MP and HS. In both rules, there is a part of the
premises that is lost in the conclusion. In case of MP, where we have {α, α −→ β} ⊢ β, the statement α
is not present in the conclusion and in case of HS, where {α −→ β, β −→ γ} ⊢ α −→ γ, the statement
β is forgotten in the conclusion. So it is possible that the α in MP and the β in HS are unrelated to the
conclusion. The restrictions in RMP and RHS prevent this irrelevance of the forgotten statements.
3 Logics with the restricted rules of inference
3.1 Intuitionistic paraconsistent weak Kleene logic (IPWK)
Let L = {∧,∨,−→,¬, 0, 1} be a logical language, where the arities of the operators ∧,∨,−→,¬, 0, 1 are
2, 2, 2, 1, 0, and 0, respectively. Suppose V is a countable set of propositional variables and let Fm denote
the formula algebra over V of type L.
3.1.1 Semantic definition of IPWK via extended Heyting algebras
We note that any Heyting algebra is of the above type L. Now for any Heyting algebra H with universe
H , we define its extension H# as the algebra with universe H ∪ {ω}, where ω is a new symbol outside the
class of all Heyting algebras. We define the operations in H# as extensions of the operations in H using the
following contamination principle.
¬ω = ω and a ◦ ω = ω for all a ∈ H ∪ {ω},
where ◦ denotes any binary connective in L. Then clearly, each extended Heyting algebra, although not a
Heyting algebra, is an algebra of type L as well.
Let H = {H# | H is a Heyting algebra} be the class of all these extended Heyting algebras. It is clear that
for each Heyting algebra H, there is a unique extension H# ∈ H. Moreover, for each H# ∈ H, there exists
a Heyting algebra H corresponding to it and the universe of H# is H ∪ {ω}, H being the universe of H.
We now consider the L-matrices
〈
H#, {1, ω}
〉
and semantically define the logic IPWK as the logic 〈Fm, |=IPWK〉,
where |=IPWK⊆ P(Fm)×Fm is called the semantic consequence relation for IPWK. This is defined as follows.
For any Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm , Σ |=IPWK α iff for every H# ∈ H and every valuation v# : Fm→ H#,
v#[Σ] ⊆ {1, ω} implies v#(α) ∈ {1, ω}.
It is well known that the class of Heyting algebras is the algebraic interpretation of intuitionistic propositional
logic (IPC), that is, IPC is sound and complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras [30, Volume
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II, Chapter 13, §5]. IPC can be described syntactically as the logic 〈Fm,⊢IPC〉, where Fm is the formula
algebra of type L and ⊢IPC is a substitution-invariant (syntactic) consequence relation on Fm. On the other
hand, we can consider the L-matrices 〈H, {1}〉, whereH is a Heyting algebra, and describe IPC semantically
as the logic 〈Fm, |=IPC〉, where |=IPC⊆ P(Fm)×Fm . The latter is defined as follows. For any Σ∪{α} ⊆ Fm ,
Σ |=IPC α iff for every Heyting algebra H and every valuation v : Fm→ H
v[Σ] ⊆ {1} implies v(α) = 1.
Then by the soundness and completness of IPC with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras, we have for
any Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm ,
Σ ⊢IPC α iff Σ |=IPC α.
We now discuss a connection between the semantic consequence relations, |=IPC and |=IPWK, in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.1. For all Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm , we have that Σ |=IPWK α if and only if there is a ∆ ⊆ Σ such that
var(∆) ⊆ var(α) and ∆ |=IPC α. Moreover, since IPC is finitary, we can find such a ∆ ⊆ Σ that is finite.
Proof. Suppose that Σ |=IPWK α. Let ∆ = {ϕ ∈ Σ | var(ϕ) ⊆ var(α)}. We will show that ∆ |=IPC α.
Let H be a Heyting algebra and v : Fm → H be a valuation such that v[∆] ⊆ {1}. We note that v[∆] = ∅
iff ∆ = ∅, thus ∆ 6= ∅ implies v[∆] = {1}.
Let H# be the extended Heyting algebra corresponding to H. We now construct the valuation v# : Fm→
H# by mapping variables as follows.
v#(p) =
{
v(p) if p ∈ var(α)
ω if p /∈ var(α)
If Σ = ∅, then |=IPWK α, which implies that v
#(α) ∈ {1, ω}. Now clearly, v#(α) = v(α) ∈ H. Hence
v(α) = 1. Thus in this case, we have
∆ = ∅ |=IPC α, that is, |=IPC α.
Now suppose Σ 6= ∅ and ϕ ∈ Σ. Then we have the following cases.
Case 1: var(ϕ) ⊆ var(α).
In this case, ϕ ∈ ∆ and v#(ϕ) = v(ϕ) ∈ v[∆]. So since ∆ 6= ∅ and hence v[∆] = {1}, we have v#(ϕ) = 1.
Case 2: var(ϕ) ∩ (var(Σ) \ var(α)) 6= ∅.
In this case, v#(ϕ) = ω.
Thus we conclude that, for any ϕ ∈ Σ, v#(ϕ) ∈ {1, ω}, that is, v#[Σ] ⊆ {1, ω}.
Then since Σ |=IPWK α, v
#(α) ∈ {1, ω}. Now v#(α) = v(α) ∈ H.
Hence v(α) = 1. Since H was an arbitrarily chosen Heyting algebra and v : Fm → H was an arbitrarily
chosen valuation with v[∆] ⊆ {1}, this proves that ∆ |=IPC α.
Conversely, suppose that there is some ∆ ⊆ Σ, with var(∆) ⊆ var(α), such that ∆ |=IPC α. We need to
show that Σ |=IPWK α.
Let H# ∈ H be an extended Heyting algebra, and v# : Fm→ H# be a valuation such that v#[Σ] ⊆ {1, ω}.
Following are the possible cases.
Case 1: v#(p) = ω for some p ∈ var(α).
Then v#(α) = ω ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 2: v#(p) 6= ω for all p ∈ var(α).
Let H be the Heyting algebra corresponding to H#. Let a0 ∈ H , the universe of H. Then we construct a
valuation v : Fm→ H by mapping the variables as follows.
v(p) =
{
v#(p) if p ∈ var(α)
a0 otherwise
Then since var(∆) ⊆ var(α), v[∆] = v#[∆] ⊆ v#[Σ] ⊆ {1, ω}.
So v[∆] ⊆ {1, ω}∩H = {1}. Since ∆ |=IPC α, this implies that v(α) = 1. Now clearly, v#(α) = v(α). Hence
v#(α) = 1 ∈ {1, ω}.
This proves that Σ |=IPWK α.
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Remark 3.2. The special case in the forward direction of the above proof where Σ = ∅ shows that if
|=IPWK α, then |=IPC α.
Conversely, if |=IPC α, then we proceed similarly as in the converse direction of the above proof. LetH# ∈ H
and v# : Fm→ H# be any valuation. Case 1 in the above proof of the converse direction remains unchanged.
For Case 2, we use H, a0 ∈ H, and define the valuation v as in the above proof. Now we note that since
|=IPC α, v(α) = 1. As before, since v#(α) = v(α), this implies that v#(α) = 1 ∈ {1, ω}. Thus |=IPWK α.
Hence we can conclude that |=IPWK α iff |=IPC α.
3.1.2 An axiomatization of IPWK
We now introduce a Hilbert system HIPWK and then prove that it is sound and complete with respect to
valuations in extended Heyting algebras and hence is the syntactic counterpart of IPWK.
Definition 3.3. HIPWK is the logic 〈Fm,⊢HIPWK〉, where ⊢HIPWK is the substitution-invariant syntactic
consequence relation of the deductive system with the following axioms and inference rule.
A1. α −→ (β −→ α);
A2. (α −→ (β −→ γ)) −→ ((α −→ β) −→ (α −→ γ));
A3. α −→ (β −→ (α ∧ β));
A4. α ∧ β −→ α;
A5. α ∧ β −→ β;
A6. α −→ α ∨ β;
A7. β −→ α ∨ β;
A8. (α −→ γ) −→ ((β −→ γ) −→ (α ∨ β −→ γ));
A9. (α −→ β) −→ ((α −→ ¬β) −→ ¬α);
A10. 0 −→ α;
[RMP]
α, α −→ β
β
provided that var(α) ⊆ var(β).
Remark 3.4. The only difference between HIPWK and IPC is the restriction on modus ponens. In other
words, axioms (A1)–(A10) along with unrestricted modus ponens constitute a Hilbert system for IPC.
Because of the restricted nature of the inference relation, HIPWK is weaker than IPC. Interestingly however,
both logics have the same theorems, as shown below.
Theorem 3.5. For any ϕ ∈ Fm, ⊢HIPWK ϕ if and only if ⊢IPC ϕ.
Proof. The left-to-right direction is easy to see, because if ⊢HIPWK ϕ, then there is a proof D of ϕ that
consists of instances of the axioms of HIPWK and RMP. Since (A1)–(A10) are theorems of IPC, and RMP
is an instance of the unrestricted modus ponens, D is also a proof of ϕ in the deductive system for IPC given
by the axioms (A1)–(A10) and modus ponens.
For the right-to-left direction, suppose ⊢IPC ϕ and D = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉 is a proof of ϕ in the deductive system
for IPC. We need to show that this proof of ϕ can be translated into another proof of it that uses only RMP.
We will show this by induction on the length n of D.
For the base case, that is, when n = 1, ϕ = ϕ1 must be an axiom and there is nothing to prove.
As our induction hypothesis, we assume that the claim holds for all 1 ≤ l < n, where n is some positive
integer. That is, each ϕl in D, where 1 ≤ l < n, has a proof in HIPWK.
For the induction step, we need to show that ϕn has a proof in HIPWK. If ϕn is an axiom, then the
argument is the same as in the base case. Now suppose and ϕn is obtained via modus ponens from ϕi
and ϕj = ϕi −→ ϕn, where i, j < n. So by the induction hypothesis, there are proofs of ϕi and ϕj in
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HIPWK. Let 〈ψ1, . . . , ψm〉 be the result of gluing these two HIPWK proofs, so that ψk = ϕi (k < m), and
ψm = ϕj = ϕi −→ ϕn = ψk −→ ϕn. Now consider a substitution of variables σ defined by
σ(p) =
{
p if p ∈ var(ϕn)
a otherwise
,
where a is some fixed variable in ϕn or 0 if var(ϕn) = ∅.
We note that σ transforms any instance of an axiom into another instance of the same axiom. Moreover, if
for some s, t < m, ψt is obtained from ψs and ψs −→ ψt by an application of RMP, then var(ψs) ⊆ var(ψt).
This implies that var(σ(ψs)) ⊆ var(σ(ψt)). Hence σ(ψt) can be obtained by RMP from σ(ψs), and σ(ψs −→
ψt) = σ(ψs) −→ σ(ψt). Thus 〈σ(ψ1), . . . , σ(ψm)〉 is still a proof in HIPWK. Now
σ(ψm) = σ(ψk −→ ϕn) = σ(ψk) −→ σ(ϕn) = σ(ψk) −→ ϕn,
since σ fixes the variables of ϕn. Moreover, var(σ(ψk)) ⊆ var(ϕn), by definition of σ. Thus RMP can be
applied on σ(ψk) and σ(ψm) to obtain ϕn, and 〈σ(ψ1), . . . , σ(ψk), . . . , σ(ψm), ϕn〉 is a proof of ϕn in HIPWK.
Hence by the principle of mathematical induction, any proof of a theorem ϕ in IPC can be translated to a
proof of it in HIPWK.
We next discuss the Deduction theorem and its converse in HIPWK. These are important meta-theorems that
can be proved for classical and intuitionistic logics. Given a logic S = 〈Fm,⊢S〉, the Deduction theorem and
its converse (if they hold in S) together assert that, for any Σ∪{α, β} ⊆ Fm , Σ∪{α} ⊢S β iff Σ ⊢S α −→ β.
We note in the following theorem that the Deduction theorem holds in HIPWK as well, but due to the
restriction on the modus ponens rule, the converse of it has to be suitably restricted.
Theorem 3.6 (Restricted Deduction Theorem). For any Σ ∪ {α, β} ⊆ Fm, we have the following.
(i) If Σ ∪ {α} ⊢HIPWK β then Σ ⊢HIPWK α −→ β.
(ii) If Σ ⊢HIPWK α −→ β and var(α) ⊆ var(β), then Σ ∪ {α} ⊢HIPWK β.
Proof. (i) Suppose Σ ∪ {α} ⊢HIPWK β. Let D = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn = β〉 be a derivation of β from Σ ∪ {α} in
HIPWK. We will show that Σ ⊢HIPWK α −→ β by induction on the length n of D.
For the basis step, n = 1, and so ϕ1 = β. Following are the possible cases.
Case 1: Σ ⊢HIPWK β.
This case includes the possibility of β being a theorem or a member of Σ. We then have the following
deduction of α −→ β from Σ.
(1) β (follows from Σ)
(2) β −→ (α −→ β) (axiom (A1))
(3) α −→ β (RMP on (1) and (2) since var(β) ⊆ var(α −→ β))
Case 2: β = α.
We know that ⊢IPC α −→ α, which implies by Theorem 3.5, that ⊢HIPWK α −→ α. Hence Σ ⊢HIPWK
α −→ α.
As our induction hypothesis, we assume that the claim holds for all 1 ≤ k < n, where n is some positive
integer.
Now for the induction step, we need to show that the claim holds when the length of the derivation D
of β from Σ∪{α} is n. Here, in addition to the two cases discussed in the basis step, the only additional
path to arriving at Σ ∪ {α} ⊢HIPWK β is by an application of RMP on some ϕi and ϕj = ϕi −→ β,
where i, j < n and var(ϕi) ⊆ var(β). Then, by the induction hypothesis,
Σ ⊢HIPWK α −→ ϕi, and
Σ ⊢HIPWK α −→ ϕj , that is, Σ ⊢HIPWK α −→ (ϕi −→ β)
We now have the following derivation of α −→ β from Σ.
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(1) (α −→ (ϕi −→ β)) −→ ((α −→ ϕi) −→ (α −→ β)) (axiom (A2))
(2) α −→ (ϕi −→ β) (follows from Σ)
(3) (α −→ ϕi) −→ (α −→ β) (RMP on (1) and (2))
(4) α −→ ϕi (follows from Σ)
(5) α −→ β (RMP on (3) and (4), since var(ϕi) ⊆ var(β))
Thus, by the principle of mathematical induction, if Σ ∪ {α} ⊢HIPWK β then Σ ⊢HIPWK α −→ β.
(ii) Suppose Σ ⊢HIPWK α −→ β and var(α) ⊆ var(β). Then there is a derivation D = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn =
(α −→ β)〉 of α −→ β from Σ in HIPWK. We then have the following derivation of β from Σ ∪ {α}.
D


(1) ϕ1
...
...
(n) ϕn = α −→ β
(n+ 1) α
(n+ 2) β (RMP on (n) and (n+ 1) since var(α) ⊆ var(β))
Hence Σ ∪ {α} ⊢HIPWK β.
Remark 3.7. Theorem 3.5 tells us that the restricted modus ponens is sufficient for deriving any theorem
of IPC. However, the same cannot be said about conclusions entailed by a non-empty set of premises, that
is, it is not the case that Σ ⊢HIPWK α iff Σ ⊢IPC α for all Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm, when Σ 6= ∅. In fact, for
any Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm , Σ ⊢HIPWK α implies Σ ⊢IPC α but the converse does not hold, in general. Examples
illustrating this are provided in Remarks 3.16, 3.18 and 3.19.
It is also noteworthy that the proof of the Deduction Theorem 3.6 is the same as the proof of the Deduction
Theorem in IPC, thus pointing out that RMP is sufficient for proving the Deduction theorem in IPC.
Another interesting consequence of the restriction on the converse of the Deduction theorem is as follows.
For any α, β ∈ Fm, α ⊢HIPWK β implies that ⊢HIPWK α −→ β but the converse does not hold, in general.
Similar remarks can be made regarding PWK, some of which are discussed in [7, 5].
3.1.3 Soundness and Completeness
We now show that HIPWK is sound and complete with respect to valuations in extended Heyting algebras.
This would then imply that IPWK and HIPWK are the semantic and syntactic presentations of the same
logic.
Definition 3.8. Given a formula ϕ ∈ Fm and an extended Heyting algebra H# ∈ H, we say that ϕ is true
in H# if for any valuation v# : Fm→ H#, v#(ϕ) ∈ {1, ω}.
A formula ϕ ∈ Fm is said to be valid if it is true in every H# ∈ H. Clearly, a formula is valid iff |=IPWK ϕ.
Lemma 3.9 (Soundness). For any ϕ ∈ Fm , if ⊢HIPWK ϕ, then |=IPWK ϕ, that is, every theorem of HIPWK
is valid. Thus in particular, every axiom of HIPWK is valid.
Proof. Suppose ⊢HIPWK ϕ. Let H# ∈ H be an extended Heyting algebra and v# : Fm → H# be any
valuation.
Case 1: v#(p) = ω for some variable p ∈ var(ϕ).
Clearly, in this case we have v#(ϕ) = ω ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 2: v#(p) 6= ω for any p ∈ var(ϕ).
In this case, v#(p) ∈ H, the Heyting algebra corresponding to H#, for all p ∈ var(ϕ). This implies that
v#(ϕ) ∈ H. We now construct the valuation v : Fm→ H by mapping the variables as follows.
v(p) =
{
v#(p) if p ∈ var(ϕ)
a0 otherwise,
where a0 is some fixed element in H. Then v(ϕ) = v
#(ϕ).
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Now since ⊢HIPWK ϕ, by Theorem 3.5, we have ⊢IPC ϕ. Then by the soundness of IPC with respect to
valuations in Heyting algebras, |=IPC ϕ. Thus v(ϕ) = 1, which implies that v#(ϕ) = 1.
Hence v#(ϕ) ∈ {1, ω} in all cases. Since H# and v# : Fm→ H# were arbitrary, we have |=IPWK ϕ.
Lemma 3.10. Suppose ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm with var(ϕ) ⊆ var(ψ). Then for any H# ∈ H, and any valuation
v# : Fm→ H#, if v#(ϕ), v#(ϕ −→ ψ) ∈ {1, ω}, then v#(ψ) ∈ {1, ω}. Thus RMP preserves truth.
Proof. Suppose ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm with var(ϕ) ⊆ var(ψ). Let H# ∈ H be an extended Heyting algebra and
v# : Fm→ H# be a valuation such that v#(ϕ), v#(ϕ −→ ψ) ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 1: Suppose v#(ϕ) = ω and v#(ϕ −→ ψ) ∈ {1, ω}.
Then there exists a variable p ∈ var(ϕ) such that v#(p) = ω. Since var(ϕ) ⊆ var(ψ), it follows that p ∈ var(ψ)
and hence var(ψ) = ω.
Case 2: Suppose v#(ϕ) = 1 and v#(ϕ −→ ψ) = ω.
Then there is a p ∈ var(ϕ −→ ψ) = var(ϕ) ∪ var(ψ) such that v#(p) = ω. Now since v#(ϕ) 6= ω, p /∈ var(ϕ).
Thus p ∈ var(ψ) which implies that v#(ψ) = ω.
Case 3: Suppose v#(ϕ) = v#(ϕ −→ ψ) = 1.
Thus v#(p) 6= ω for all p ∈ var(ϕ) ∪ var(ψ). Let H be the Heyting algebra corresponding to H#. We now
define a valuation v : Fm→ H by mapping the variables as follows.
v(p) =
{
v#(p) if p ∈ var(ϕ) ∪ var(ψ)
0 otherwise
We note that v(ϕ) = v#(ϕ) = 1 and v(ϕ −→ ψ) = v#(ϕ −→ ψ) = 1. Then since MP is a rule of inference in
IPC, and IPC is sound with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras, v(ψ) = 1. Moreover, v#(ψ) = v(ψ).
Thus v#(ψ) = 1.
Thus in all cases, v#(ψ) ∈ {1, ω}. Since H# and v# : Fm→ H# were arbitrary, we can conclude that RMP
preserves truth.
Remark 3.11. An alternative proof of the above lemma can be obtained using Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.12 (Strong Soundness). For all Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm , if Σ ⊢HIPWK α, then Σ |=IPWK α.
Proof. Suppose Σ ⊢HIPWK α. We note that if Σ = ∅ then this reduces to Lemma 3.9. So suppose Σ 6= ∅.
Let D = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn(= α)〉 be a derivation of α from Σ in HIPWK.
Suppose H# ∈ H, and v# : Fm→ H# be a valuation such that v#[Σ] ⊆ {1, ω}. Since Σ 6= ∅, v#[Σ] 6= ∅.
We note that each ϕi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, in D is an instance of an axiom of HIPWK, or is an element of Σ, or is
obtained by applying RMP. We will now show that v#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω} for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by induction on i.
Base case: i = 1
Then ϕi = ϕ1 is either an instance of an axiom of HIPWK or is a member of Σ. If ϕi is an axiom, then by
Lemma 3.9, |=IPWK ϕ, that is, v
#(ϕ1) ∈ {1, ω}. On the other hand, if ϕ1 ∈ Σ, then v
#(ϕ1) ∈ {1, ω} by our
assumption.
Induction hypothesis: Suppose ∅ 6= v#[{ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1}] ⊆ {1, ω} for some 1 < i ≤ n.
Induction step: We need to show that v#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω}. If ϕi is an axiom or a member of Σ, then the
same reasoning as in the base case proves that v#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω}. Finally, suppose ϕi is obtained from ϕj and
ϕk = ϕj −→ ϕi in D, where j, k < i by applying RMP. Then by the induction hypothesis, v#(ϕj), v#(ϕk) ∈
{1, ω}. Hence by Lemma 3.10, v#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω}.
Thus v#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω} for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence v#(α) = v#(ϕn) ∈ {1, ω}. Since H# ∈ H and v# : Fm→
H# were arbitrary, this implies that Σ |=IPWK α.
Theorem 3.13 (Completeness). For any ϕ ∈ Fm , if |=IPWK ϕ then ⊢HIPWK ϕ, that is, every valid formula
is a theorem of HIPWK.
Proof. Suppose |=IPWK ϕ. So by Theorem 3.1, |=IPC ϕ.
Then by the completeness of IPC with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras [30, Volume II, Chapter 13,
§5], ⊢IPC ϕ.
Hence by Theorem 3.5, ⊢HIPWK ϕ.
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Theorem 3.14 (Strong Completeness). For all Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm , if Σ |=IPWK α, then Σ ⊢HIPWK α.
Proof. Suppose Σ |=IPWK α. If Σ = ∅, then this reduces to Theorem 3.13. So we assume that Σ 6= ∅.
Then by Theorem 3.1, there exists a finite ∆ ⊆ Σ, with var(∆) ⊆ var(α), such that ∆ |=IPC α. Thus for
any Heyting algebra H and any valuation v : Fm → H, if v[∆] ⊆ {1} then v(α) = 1. By the completeness
of IPC with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras, ∆ ⊢IPC α.
If ∆ = ∅, then ⊢IPC α. So by Theorem 3.5, ⊢HIPWK α, which implies that Σ ⊢HIPWK α. Now suppose
∅ 6= ∆ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}. Then by applying the deduction theorem in IPC n times, we have
⊢IPC (ϕ1 −→ (. . . −→ (ϕn −→ α) . . .)).
Therefore, by Theorem 3.5, we have
⊢HIPWK (ϕ1 −→ (. . . −→ (ϕn −→ α) . . .)).
Now since var(∆) ⊆ var(α), by applying Theorem 3.6 n times, we have ∆ ⊢HIPWK α. Finally, since ∆ ⊆ Σ,
we have Σ ⊢HIPWK α.
Remark 3.15. In view of the above soundness and completeness theorems for HIPWK with respect to valu-
ations in extended Heyting algebras, we can conclude that HIPWK and IPWK are the syntactic and semantic
presentations, respectively, of the same logic. Henceforth, we will thus use these two names interchangeably.
Remark 3.16. It follows from Theorem 2.3 that MP fails in IPWK. Thus there exists α, β ∈ Fm , such that
{α, α −→ β} 6|=IPWK β and hence by the soundness theorem 3.12, {α, α −→ β} 6⊢HIPWK β.
Theorem 3.17. Restricted hypothetical syllogism holds in IPWK.
Proof. We will invoke Theorem 2.5 to show that RHS holds in IPWK.
Let H# be an extended Heyting algebra and v# : Fm → H# a valuation. We need to show that v#
satisfies the two conditions in Theorem 2.5. Clearly, v# satisfies condition (ii). Suppose α, β, γ ∈ Fm
such that v#(α −→ β), v#(β −→ γ) = 1. Since v# satisfies the condition (ii), v#(p) 6= ω for all p ∈
var(α) ∪ var(β) ∪ var(γ). Let H be the Heyting algebra corresponding to H#. We now construct the
valuation v : Fm→ H by mapping variables as follows.
v(p) =
{
v#(p) if p ∈ var(α) ∪ var(β) ∪ var(γ)
0 otherwise
Thus v(α −→ β) = v#(α −→ β) = 1 and v(β −→ γ) = v#(β −→ γ) = 1. Since HS holds in IPC and IPC is
sound with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras, v(α −→ γ) = 1. Thus v#(α −→ γ) = v(α −→ γ) = 1.
Thus v# satisfies condition (i) of Theorem 2.5.
Since v# : Fm → H# was arbitrary, every valuation from Fm into H# satisfies the two conditions in
Theorem 2.5. Thus for all α, β, γ ∈ Fm and for any valuation v# : Fm → H#, var(β) ⊆ var(α) ∪ var(γ) ∈
{1, ω} imply var(α −→ γ) ∈ {1, ω} by Theorem 2.5.
Finally as H# was an arbitrary extended Heyting algebra, the above is true for any H# ∈ H. Hence RHS
preserves truth. Thus by the soundness theorem 3.12, we can conclude that for any α, β, γ ∈ Fm , with
var(β) ⊆ var(α) ∪ var(γ), {α −→ β, β −→ γ} ⊢HIPWK α −→ γ.
Remark 3.18. HS fails in IPWK. To see this, consider α = p, β = q, and γ = r, where p, q, r are variables
such that q is distinct from p and r. Suppose H# ∈ H. Let v# : Fm → H# be a valuation such that
v#(p) = 1, v#(q) = ω, and v#(r) = 0. Then clearly,
v#(α −→ β), v#(β −→ γ) = ω ∈ {1, ω} but v#(α −→ γ) = 1 −→ 0 = 0.
Thus {α −→ β, β −→ γ} 6|=IPWK α −→ γ. Hence {α −→ β, β −→ γ} 6⊢HIPWK α −→ γ by Theorem 3.12.
Remark 3.19. ECQ fails in IPWK. To see this, consider α = p, where p is a variable, and a valuation
v# : Fm → H#, where H# ∈ H, such that v#(p) = ω. Then v#[{α,¬α}] = {ω}. Now consider β = q,
where q is a variable different from p, such that v#(q) = 0. Then we see that {α,¬α} 6|=IPWK β. Thus by
Theorem 3.12, {α,¬α} 6⊢HIPWK β. Hence IPWK is paraconsistent.
However, it is interesting to note that 0 −→ α is an axiom of IPWK.
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Remark 3.20. LNC is a theorem of IPWK since LNC is a theorem of IPC, by Theorem 3.5. Thus IPWK
is not strongly paraconsistent.
However, it is noteworthy that α ∧ ¬α is not false for all α ∈ Fm. To see this, consider α = p, where p is a
variable, and a valuation v# : Fm→ H#, where H# ∈ H, such that v#(p) = ω.
3.2 Paraconsistent pre-rough logic (PPRL)
Definition 3.21. Suppose L = {∧,∨,¬, 0, 1} is a logical language, where ∧,∨,¬, 0, 1 are operators with
arities 2, 2, 1, 0, 0 respectively. Then an algebra Q of type L, with universe Q, is called a quasi-Boolean
algebra if the following conditions are satisfied.
(i) Q as an algebra of type L \ {¬} is a bounded distributive lattice.
(ii) ¬¬a = a for all a ∈ Q.
(iii) ¬(a ∨ b) = ¬a ∧ ¬b for all a, b ∈ Q.
Remark 3.22. The difference between a Boolean algebra and a quasi-Boolean algebra is that in the latter
we do not necessarily have a ∨ ¬a = 1 or equivalently, a ∧ ¬a = 0 for all a in its universe.
Remark 3.23. Quasi-Boolean algebras were named such and investigated by Bia lynicki-Birula and Rasiowa
in [4]. Essentially identical structures, with no least element, were also studied by Moisil in [20] under the
name de Morgan lattices, and by Kalman in [17] under the name distributive i-lattices. The above definition
of a quasi-Boolean algebra can be found in [27]. For more on quasi-Boolean algebras and comparisons
between quasi-Boolean algebras, De Morgan lattices, and distributive i-lattices, see [27, 15, 11].
Definition 3.24. Suppose L = {∧,∨,−→,¬, I, C, 0, 1} is a logical language, where the arities of ∧,∨,−→
,¬, I, C, 0, 1 are 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0 respectively. Then an algebra R of type L, with universe R, is called a
pre-rough algebra if the following conditions hold.
(i) R as an algebra of type L \ {−→, I, C} is a quasi-Boolean algebra.
(ii) I1 = 1.
(iii) I(a ∧ b) = Ia ∧ Ib for all a, b ∈ R.
(iv) ¬Ia ∨ Ia = 1 for all a ∈ R.
(v) Ia −→ a = 1 for all a ∈ R.
(vi) Ca = ¬I¬a for all a ∈ R.
(vii) a −→ b = (¬Ia ∨ Ib) ∧ (¬Ca ∨ Cb) for all a, b ∈ R.
(viii) Ca −→ Cb = 1 and Ia −→ Ib = 1 imply a −→ b = 1 for all a, b ∈ R.
Remark 3.25. A pre-rough algebra was first defined in [1]. This was streamlined later in [28]. Both these
definitions used an order relation as a primitive. The above definition of a pre-rough algebra, although
equivalent, is slightly different from both the original and the streamlined definitions in the following ways.
We have not included the order relation as part of the language to stay consistent with the definitions of
the other algebras in this paper. We have included more primitive operators than necessary. It is easy to
see that ‘∨’ can be defined in terms of ‘¬’ and ‘∧’ using condition (iii) of Definition 3.21; ‘C’ is defined in
terms of ‘¬’ and ‘I’ in condition (vi), and ‘−→’ is defined in terms of ‘¬’, ‘I’, and ‘C’ in condition (vii), of
Definition 3.24.
Let L be the language described in Definition 3.24, V a countable set of propositional variables, and Fm
denote the formula algebra over V of type L. We note that each pre-rough algebra is of type L. We now
present a semantic definition of PPRL below.
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3.2.1 Semantic definition of PPRL via extended pre-rough algebras
For any pre-rough algebra R with universe R, we define its extension R# as the algebra with universe
R ∪ {ω}, where ω is a new symbol outside the class all pre-rough algebras. We define the operations in
R# as extensions of the operations in R using the following so-called contamination principle previously
described in the current paper in Section 2 and for the extended Heyting algebras in Subsection 3.1.
¬ω = ω, Iω = ω, Cω = ω, and a ◦ ω = ω for all a ∈ R#,
where ◦ denotes any binary operator in L. Then each extended pre-rough algebra, although not a pre-rough
algebra, is also an algebra of type L.
Let R = {R# | R is a pre-rough algebra} be the class of all these extended pre-rough algebras. As in the
case of the extended Heyting algebras, it is clear that each pre-rough algebra R has a unique extension
R# ∈ R. Moreover, for each R# ∈ R, there exists a pre-rough algebra R corresponding to it and the
universe of R# is R ∪ {ω}, R being the universe of R.
We now consider the L-matrices
〈
R#, {1, ω}
〉
and semantically define the logic PPRL as the logic 〈Fm, |=PPRL〉,
where |=PPRL⊆ P(Fm)× Fm is the semantic consequence relation for PPRL. This is defined as follows: for
any Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm , Σ |=PPRL α iff for every R# ∈ R and every valuation v# : Fm→ R#,
v#[Σ] ⊆ {1, ω} implies v#(α) ∈ {1, ω}.
Now the class of pre-rough algebras is an algebraic interpretation of pre-rough logic (PRL), that is, PRL is
sound and complete with respect to valuations in pre-rough algebras [1, 28]. PRL can therefore be described
syntactically as the logic 〈Fm,⊢PRL〉, where Fm is the formula algebra of type L and ⊢PRL is a substitution-
invariant (syntactic) consequence relation on Fm . On the other hand, using the L-matrices 〈R, {1}〉, where
R is a pre-rough algebra, we can describe PRL semantically as the logic 〈Fm, |=PRL〉. Here the semantic
consequence relation |=PRL⊆ P(Fm) × Fm is defined as follows. For any Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm , Σ |=PRL α iff for
every pre-rough algebra R and every valuation v : Fm→ R,
v[Σ] ⊆ {1} implies v(α) = 1.
Then by the soundness and completeness of PRL with respect to valuations in pre-rough algebras, we have
for any Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm ,
Σ ⊢PRL α iff Σ |=PRL α.
We now discuss a connection between the semantic consequence relations, |=PRL and |=PPRL, in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.26. For all Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm , we have that Σ |=PPRL α if and only if there is a ∆ ⊆ Σ such that
var(∆) ⊆ var(α) and ∆ |=PRL α. Moreover, since PRL is finitary, we can find such a ∆ ⊆ Σ that is finite.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 3.1 with Heyting algebras,
extended Heyting algebras, |=IPWK, and |=IPC replaced by pre-rough algebras, extended pre-rough algebras,
|=PPRL, and |=PRL, respectively.
Remark 3.27. Similar arguments as in Remark 3.2, with obvious substitutions, can be used to show that
|=PPRL α iff |=PRL α.
3.2.2 An axiomatization of PPRL
We now present a Hilbert system HPPRL and prove that it is sound and complete with respect to valuations
in extended pre-rough algebras and hence is the syntactic counterpart of PPRL.
Definition 3.28. HPPRL is the logic 〈Fm,⊢HPPRL〉, where ⊢HPPRL is the substitution-invariant syntactic
consequence relation of the deductive system with the following axioms and inference rules.
Axioms:
A1. α −→ ¬¬α
14
A2. ¬¬α −→ α
A3. (α ∧ β) −→ β
A4. (α ∧ β) −→ (β ∧ α)
A5. (α ∧ (β ∨ γ)) −→ ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ))
A6. ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)) −→ (α ∧ (β ∨ γ))
A7. (α ∨ β) −→ ¬(¬α ∧ ¬β)
A8. ¬(¬α ∧ ¬β) −→ (α ∧ β)
A9. Cα −→ ¬I¬α
A10. ¬I¬α −→ Cα
A11. Iα −→ α
A12. (Iα ∧ Iβ) −→ I(α ∧ β)
A13. (α −→ β) −→ ((¬Iα ∨ Iβ) ∧ (¬Cα ∨ Cα))
A14. ((¬Iα ∨ Iβ) ∧ (¬Cα ∨ Cα)) −→ (α −→ β)
Rules of inference:
R1.
α, α −→ β
β
provided var(α) ⊆ var(β) [RMP]
R2.
α −→ β, β −→ γ
α −→ γ
provided var(β) ⊆ var(α) ∪ var(γ) [RHS]
R3.
α
β −→ α
R4.
α −→ β
¬β −→ ¬α
R5.
α −→ β, α −→ γ
α −→ (β ∧ γ)
R6.
α −→ β, β −→ α, γ −→ δ, δ −→ γ
(α −→ γ) −→ (β −→ δ)
R7.
α −→ β
Iα −→ Iβ
R8.
α
Iα
R9.
Iα −→ Iβ, Cα −→ Cβ
α −→ β
Remark 3.29. The axioms (A1)–(A14) above along with unrestricted modus ponens (MP), unrestricted
hypothetical syllogism (HS), and the rules of inference (R3)–(R9) constitute a Hilbert system for PRL.
That is, PRL and HPPRL differ only in the restrictions to the two rules of inference, modus ponens and
hypothetical syllogism. HPPRL is thus a weaker system than PRL. However, we will show below that both
logics have the same theorems.
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Remark 3.30. Hilbert systems for PRL can be found in [1, 28]. The list of axioms for PRL in these
papers are, however, slimmer than than the one presented here. This is because we have taken the operators
∨, C, and −→ primitive here, while in [1, 28] these are defined from the other operators using what we have
in Definition 3.28 as axioms (A7), (A8), (A9), (A10), (A13), and (A14).
Theorem 3.31. For any ϕ ∈ Fm, ⊢HPPRL ϕ if and only if ⊢PRL ϕ.
Proof. Suppose ⊢HPPRL ϕ. Then there is a proof D of ϕ that consists of instances of the axioms and rules of
HPPRL. We note that the axioms (A1)–(A14) are theorems of PRL, the rules (R3)–(R9) are rules of PRL,
and RMP, RHS are instances of (unrestricted) MP and HS, respectively. Thus D is also a proof of ϕ in the
deductive system for PRL given by the axioms (A1)–(A14), rules (R3)–(R9), MP and HS.
Conversely, suppose ⊢PRL ϕ and D = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉 is a proof of ϕ in PRL.
Then we need to show that this proof of ϕ can be translated into another proof of it that uses only RMP
and RHS, along with the axioms (A1)–(A14) and the rules (R3)–(R9). We will show this by induction on
the length n of D, that is, we will show that each sentence in D has a proof in HPPRL.
For the base case, n = 1. We note that ϕ1 must be an axiom of PRL. Hence ϕ1 is an axiom of HPPRL as
well.
As our induction hypothesis, we assume that the claim holds for all 1 ≤ l < n. That is, each ϕl in D, where
1 ≤ l < n, has a proof in HPPRL.
Now for the induction step, we need to show that ϕn can be derived in HPPRL. Following are the possible
cases.
Case 1: ϕn is an axiom of PRL.
This case is the same as the base case.
Case 2: ϕn is derived from a subset of {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn−1} by one or more applications of the rules (R3)–(R9)
in PRL.
By the induction hypothesis each ϕi with 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 has a proof in HPPRL. Since (R3)–(R9) are also rules
of inference in HPPRL, we can conclude that ϕn can be derived in HPPRL from a subset of {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn−1}
using (R3)–(R9).
Case 3: ϕn is obtained via modus ponens from ϕi and ϕj = ϕi −→ ϕn, where 1 ≤ i, j < n. So by the
induction hypothesis, there are proofs of ϕi and ϕj in HPPRL. Let 〈ψ1, . . . , ψm〉 be the result of gluing these
two HPPRL proofs, so that ψk = ϕi (k < m), and ψm = ϕj = ϕi −→ ϕn = ψk −→ ϕn. Now consider a
substitution of variables σ defined by
σ(p) =
{
p if p ∈ var(ϕn)
a otherwise
,
where a is some fixed variable in ϕn or 0 if var(ϕn) = ∅.
We note that σ transforms any instance of an axiom of HPPRL into another instance of the same axiom.
Since σ preserves the forms of the sentences ψ1, . . . , ψm, the rules (R3)–(R9) remain equally applicable after
the substitution.
Now suppose for some 1 ≤ s, t < m, ψt is obtained from ψs and ψs −→ ψt by an application of RMP. Then
var(ψs) ⊆ var(ψt), which implies that var(σ(ψs)) ⊆ var(σ(ψt)). So σ(ψt) can be obtained from σ(ψs) and
σ(ψs −→ ψt) = σ(ψs) −→ σ(ψt) by RMP.
Finally, suppose ψt, where 1 ≤ t < m, is obtained from ψs and ψu for some 1 ≤ s, u < t by an application
of RHS. Then ψt is of the form θ1 −→ θ3 and, without loss of generality, we can assume that ψs, ψu are
of the forms θ1 → θ2 and θ2 −→ θ3, respectively. Moreover, var(θ2) ⊆ var(θ1) ∪ var(θ3). This implies
that var(σ(θ2)) ⊆ var(σ(θ1)) ∪ var(σ(θ3)). Hence σ(ψt)) = σ(θ1) −→ σ(θ3) can be obtained from σ(ψs) =
σ(θ1) −→ σ(θ2) and σ(ψu) = σ(θ2) −→ σ(θ3) by an application of RHS.
Thus 〈σ(ψ1), . . . , σ(ψm)〉 is still a proof in HPPRL. Now
σ(ψm) = σ(ψk −→ ϕn) = σ(ψk) −→ σ(ϕn) = σ(ψk) −→ ϕn,
since σ fixes the variables of ϕn. Moreover, var(σ(ψk)) ⊆ var(ϕn), by definition of σ. Thus we can apply
RMP to obtain ϕn from σ(ψk) and σ(ψm), and 〈σ(ψ1), . . . , σ(ψk), . . . , σ(ψm), ϕn〉 is a proof of ϕn in HPPRL.
Case 4: ϕn is obtained by applying hypothetical syllogism on ϕi and ϕj , where 1 ≤ i, j < n. Then ϕn is of
the form θ1 −→ θ3 and, without loss of generality, we can assume that ϕi, ϕj are of the forms θ1 −→ θ2 and
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θ2 −→ θ3, respectively. By the induction hypothesis, there are proofs of ϕi = θ1 −→ θ2 and ϕj = θ2 −→ θ3
in HPPRL. Let 〈ψ1, . . . , ψm〉 be the result of gluing these two HPPRL proofs, so that ψk = ϕi (k < m), and
ψm = ϕj . We now consider a substitution of variables τ defined by
τ(p) =
{
p if p ∈ var(θ1) ∪ var(θ3)
a otherwise
,
where a is some fixed member of var(θ1) ∪ var(θ3) or 0 if var(θ1) ∪ var(θ3) = ∅. Then 〈τ(ψ1), . . . , τ(ψm)〉 is
still a proof in HPPRL, by similar arguments as in Case 3.
Now since τ fixes the variables of θ1 and θ3, we have
τ(ψk) = τ(ϕi) = τ(θ1 −→ θ2) = τ(θ1) −→ τ(θ2) = θ1 −→ τ(θ2),
and
τ(ψm) = τ(ϕj) = τ(θ2 −→ θ3) = τ(θ2) −→ τ(θ3) = τ(θ2) −→ θ3,
Moreover, by our design of τ , var(τ(θ2)) ⊆ var(θ1) ∪ var(θ3). Thus ϕn = θ1 −→ θ3 can be obtained from
τ(ψk) and τ(ψm) by an application of RHS, and 〈τ(ψ1), . . . , τ(ψk), . . . , τ(ψm), ϕn〉 is a proof of it in HPPRL.
This completes the induction and we can thus conclude that any proof of a theorem ϕ in PRL can be
translated to a proof of it in HPPRL.
Remark 3.32. Theorem 3.31 tells us that RMP and RHS, along with the axioms and other rules of PRL,
are sufficient for deriving any theorem of PRL. As in the case of IPWK–IPC connection, the same cannot
be said about conclusions entailed from non-empty sets of premises. Examples can be seen in Remarks 3.39
and 3.40.
3.2.3 Soundness and Completeness
We now show that HPPRL is sound and complete with respect to valuations in extended pre-rough algebras.
This would then imply that PPRL and HPPRL are the semantic and syntactic presentations of the same
logic.
Definition 3.33. Given a formula ϕ ∈ Fm and an extended pre-rough algebra R# ∈ R, we say that ϕ is
true in R# if for any valuation v# : Fm→ R#, v#(ϕ) ∈ {1, ω}.
A formula ϕ ∈ Fm is said to be valid if it is true in every R# ∈ R. Clearly, a formula is valid iff |=PPRL ϕ.
Lemma 3.34 (Soundness). For any ϕ ∈ Fm, if ⊢HPPRL ϕ then |=PPRL ϕ, that is, every theorem of HPPRL
is valid. Thus in particular, every axiom of HPPRL is valid.
Proof. Suppose ⊢HPPRL ϕ. Let R# ∈ R be an extended pre-rough algebra and v# : Fm → R# be any
valuation.
Case 1: v#(p) = ω for some variable p ∈ var(ϕ).
Clearly, in this case we have v#(ϕ) = ω ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 2: v#(p) 6= ω for all p ∈ var(ϕ).
In this case, v#(p) ∈ R, the pre-rough algebra corresponding to R#, for all p ∈ var(ϕ). This implies that
v#(ϕ) ∈ R. We now construct the valuation v : Fm→ R by mapping the variables as follows.
v(p) =
{
v#(p) if p ∈ var(ϕ)
a0 otherwise,
where a0 is some fixed element in R. Then v(ϕ) = v
#(ϕ).
Now since ⊢HPPRL ϕ, by Theorem 3.31, we have ⊢PRL ϕ. Then by the soundness of PRL with respect to
valuations in pre-rough algebras (see [1, 28]), |=PRL ϕ. Thus v(ϕ) = 1, which implies that v#(ϕ) = 1.
Hence v#(ϕ) ∈ {1, ω} in all cases. Since R# ∈ R and v# : Fm→ R# were arbitrary, |=PPRL ϕ.
Lemma 3.35. The rules of inference (R1)–(R9) in Definition 3.28 preserve truth.
Proof. We will show that for each of the rules (R1)–(R9), given an extended pre-rough algebra and a valuation
into it, if the premises are evaluated to one of the designated elements, then so is the conclusion.
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(R1)
α, α −→ β
β
provided var(α) ⊆ var(β) [RMP]
We can use the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3.10 with Heyting algebras, extended Heyting
algebras, and IPC, replaced by pre-rough algebras, extended pre-rough algebras, and PRL, respectively.
(R2)
α −→ β, β −→ γ
α −→ γ
provided var(β) ⊆ var(α) ∪ var(γ) [RHS]
We can use the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.17 with Heyting algebras, extended
Heyting algebras, and IPC, replaced by pre-rough algebras, extended pre-rough algebras, and PRL,
respectively.
(R3)
α
β −→ α
Suppose α, β ∈ Fm . Let R# ∈ R and v# : Fm→ R# be a valuation such that v#(α) ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 1: Suppose v#(α) = ω or v#(β) = ω.
Clearly, v#(β −→ α) = ω in this case.
Case 2: Suppose v#(α) = 1 and v#(β) 6= ω.
Thus for all p ∈ var(α) ∪ var(β), v#(p) 6= ω. Let R be the pre-rough algebra corresponding to R#.
We now define a valuation v : Fm→ R by mapping the variables as follows.
v(p) =
{
v#(p) if p ∈ var(α) ∪ var(β)
0 otherwise
We note that v(α) = v#(α) = 1. Then since (R3) is a rule of inference in PRL, and PRL is sound with
respect to valuations in pre-rough algebras, v(β −→ α) = 1. Moreover, v#(β −→ α) = v(β −→ α).
Thus v#(β −→ α) = 1.
Thus in all cases, v#(β −→ α) ∈ {1, ω}. SinceR# and v# : Fm→ R# were arbitrary, we can conclude
that (R3) preserves truth.
(R4)
α −→ β
¬β −→ ¬α
Suppose α, β ∈ Fm. Let R# ∈ R and v# : Fm→ R# be a valuation such that v#(α −→ β) ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 1: Suppose v#(α −→ β) = ω.
So there exists a p ∈ var(α −→ β) = var(α) ∪ var(β) such that v#(p) = ω. Then it follows that
v#(¬β −→ ¬α) = ω.
Case 2: Suppose v#(α −→ β) = 1.
We can use the same technique as in Case 2 of the above proof for (R3) to show that v#(¬β −→ ¬α) = 1.
Thus in all cases, v#(¬β −→ ¬α) ∈ {1, ω}. Since R# and v# : Fm → R# were arbitrary, we can
conclude that (R4) preserves truth.
(R5)
α −→ β, α −→ γ
α −→ (β ∧ γ)
Suppose α, β ∈ Fm. Let R# ∈ R and v# : Fm→ R# be a valuation such that v#(α −→ β), v#(α −→
γ) ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 1: Suppose ω ∈ v#[{α −→ β, α −→ γ}].
So there exists a p ∈ var(α)∪ var(β)∪ var(γ) such that v#(p) = ω. Then it follows that p ∈ var(α −→
(β ∧ γ)) and hence v#(α −→ (β ∧ γ)) = ω.
Case 2: Suppose v#(α −→ β) = v#(α −→ γ) = 1.
We can use the same technique as in Case 2 of the above proof for (R3) to show that v#(α −→
(β ∧ γ)) = 1.
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Thus in all cases, v#(α −→ (β ∧ γ)) ∈ {1, ω}. Since R# and v# : Fm → R# were arbitrary, we can
conclude that (R5) preserves truth.
(R6)
α −→ β, β −→ α, γ −→ δ, δ −→ γ
(α −→ γ) −→ (β −→ δ)
Suppose α, β, γ, δ ∈ Fm . Let R# ∈ R and v# : Fm → R# be a valuation such that v#(α −→
β), v#(β −→ α), v#(γ −→ δ), v#(δ −→ γ) ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 1: Suppose ω ∈ v# [{α −→ β, β −→ α, γ −→ δ, δ −→ γ}].
So there exists a p ∈ var(α) ∪ var(β) ∪ var(γ) ∪ var(δ) such that v#(p) = ω. Then it follows that
p ∈ var((α −→ γ) −→ (β −→ δ)) and hence v#((α −→ γ) −→ (β −→ δ)) = ω.
Case 2: Suppose v# [{α −→ β, β −→ α, γ −→ δ, δ −→ γ}] = {1}.
We can use the same technique as in Case 2 of the above proof for (R3) to show that v#((α −→ γ) −→
(β −→ δ)) = 1.
Thus in all cases, v#((α −→ γ) −→ (β −→ δ)) ∈ {1, ω}. Since R# and v# : Fm→ R# were arbitrary,
we can conclude that (R6) preserves truth.
(R7)
α −→ β
Iα −→ Iβ
Suppose α, β ∈ Fm. Let R# ∈ R and v# : Fm→ R# be a valuation such that v#(α −→ β) ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 1: Suppose v#(α −→ β) = ω.
So there exists a p ∈ var(α −→ β) = var(α) ∪ var(β) such that v#(p) = ω. Then it follows that
v#(Iα −→ Iβ) = ω.
Case 2: Suppose v#(α −→ β) = 1.
We can use the same technique as in Case 2 of the above proof for (R3) to show that v#(Iα −→ Iβ) = 1.
Thus in all cases, v#(Iα −→ Iβ) ∈ {1, ω}. Since R# and v# : Fm → R# were arbitrary, we can
conclude that (R7) preserves truth.
(R8)
α
Iα
Suppose α ∈ Fm . Let R# ∈ R and v# : Fm→ R# be a valuation such that v#(α) ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 1: Suppose v#(α) = ω.
Then it follows that v#(Iα) = ω.
Case 2: Suppose v#(α) = 1.
We can use the same technique as in Case 2 of the above proof for (R3) to show that v#(Iα) = 1.
Thus in all cases, v#(Iα) ∈ {1, ω}. Since R# and v# : Fm → R# were arbitrary, we can conclude
that (R8) preserves truth.
(R9)
Iα −→ Iβ, Cα −→ Cβ
α −→ β
Suppose α, β ∈ Fm. Let R# ∈ R and v# : Fm → R# be a valuation such that v#(Iα −→
Iβ), v#(Cα −→ Cβ) ∈ {1, ω}.
Case 1: Suppose ω ∈ v# [{Iα −→ Iβ, Cα −→ Cβ}].
So there exists a p ∈ var(α) ∪ var(β) such that v#(p) = ω. Then it follows that p ∈ var(α −→ β) and
hence v#(α −→ β) = ω.
Case 2: Suppose v#(Iα −→ Iβ) = 1 = v#(Cα −→ Cβ).
We can use the same technique as in Case 2 of the above proof for (R3) to show that v#(α −→ β) = 1.
Thus in all cases, v#(α −→ β) ∈ {1, ω}. SinceR# and v# : Fm→ R# were arbitrary, we can conclude
that (R9) preserves truth.
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Theorem 3.36 (Strong Soundness). For all Σ ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm , if Σ ⊢HPPRL α, then Σ |=PPRL α.
Proof. Suppose Σ ⊢HPPRL α. We note that the case where Σ = ∅ has already been taken care of in Lemma
3.34.
So suppose Σ 6= ∅. Let D = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn(= α)〉 be a derivation of α from Σ in HPPRL.
Suppose R# ∈ R, and v# : Fm→ R# be a valuation such that v#[Σ] ⊆ {1, ω}. Since Σ 6= ∅, v#[Σ] 6= ∅.
We note that each ϕi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, in D is an instance of an axiom of HPPRL, or is an element of Σ, or is
obtained by applying one of the rules (R1)–(R9) stated in Definition 3.28 on a subset of {ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1}. We
will now show that v#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω} for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by induction on i.
Base case: i = 1
Then ϕi = ϕ1 is either an instance of an axiom of HPPRL or a member of Σ. If ϕ1 is an axiom, then by
Lemma 3.34, |=PPRL ϕ, that is, v#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω}. On the other hand, if ϕ1 ∈ Σ, then v#(ϕ1) ∈ {1, ω} by our
assumption.
Induction hypothesis: Suppose ∅ 6= v# [{ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1}] ⊆ {1, ω} for some 1 < i ≤ n.
Induction step: We need to show that v#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω}. If ϕi is an axiom or a member of Σ, then by
the same reasoning as in the base case, we have v#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω}. Finally, suppose ϕi is obtained from a
subset of {ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1} by an application of one of the rules (R1)–(R9). Now by the induction hypothesis,
v#(ϕj) ∈ {1, ω} for each 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1. Then by Lemma 3.35, v
#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω}.
Thus v#(ϕi) ∈ {1, ω} for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence v#(α) = v#(ϕn) ∈ {1, ω}. Since R# ∈ R and v# : Fm→
R# were arbitrary, this implies that Σ |=PPRL α.
Theorem 3.37 (Completeness). For any ϕ ∈ Fm, if |=PPRL ϕ then ⊢HPPRL ϕ.
Proof. Suppose |=PPRL ϕ. So by Theorem 3.26, |=PRL ϕ.
Then by the completeness of PRL with respect to valuations in pre-rough algebras [1, 28], ⊢PRL ϕ.
Hence by Theorem 3.31, ⊢HPPRL ϕ.
Remark 3.38. In view of the above soundness and completeness theorems for HPPRL with respect to valua-
tions in extended pre-rough algebras, we can conclude that HPPRL and PPRL are the syntactic and semantic
presentations, respectively, of the same logic. Henceforth, we will thus use these two names interchangeably.
Remark 3.39. By similar arguments as in Remarks 3.16 and 3.18, we see that MP and HS fail in PPRL.
Remark 3.40. ECQ fails in PPRL. To see this, consider α = p, where p is a variable, and a valuation
v# : Fm → R#, where R# ∈ R, such that v#(p) = ω. Then v#[{α,¬α}] = {ω}. Now consider β = q,
where q is a variable different from p, such that v#(q) = 0. Thus {α,¬α} 6|=PPRL β. Then by Theorem 3.36,
{α,¬α} 6⊢HPPRL β. Hence PPRL is paraconsistent.
Remark 3.41. The algebra R, of type L = {∧,∨,−→,¬, I, C, 0, 1}, with universe R = {0, a, 1}, where
the operations are defined according to the following tables, is mentioned in [1] as the smallest non-trivial
pre-rough algebra.
¬ I C
0 1 0 0
a a a a
1 0 1 1
∧ 0 a 1
0 0 0 0
a 0 a a
1 0 a 1
∨ 0 a 1
0 0 a 1
a a a 1
1 1 1 1
−→ 0 a 1
0 1 1 1
a a a 1
1 0 a 1
Clearly, in the above pre-rough algebra, ¬(a ∧ ¬a) 6= 1. Thus by the soundness of PRL with respect to
valuations in pre-rough algebras, LNC cannot be a theorem of PRL. Then by Theorem 3.31, 6⊢HPPRL LNC.
Hence PPRL is also strongly paraconsistent.
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4 Conclusions and future directions
Our focus in this paper has mainly been the restricted rules of inference and the resulting paraconsistency
of the logics. An attempt has been made to understand the role this restrictions play in making a logic
paraconsistent. We have also commented on the similarity between the rules which needed to be restricted.
The restrictions on these rules of inference introduce a relevant flavor to the logics we have studied here.
On the semantic side, this amounts to having a contaminant or a truth value denoting indeterminacy, which
propagates through a formula as soon as any sub-formula of it is evaluated to this truth value. We would
again like to mention the following articles that discuss the contamination principle, mainly in terms of
PWK and other many-valued logics based on the Kleene algebra: [5, 7, 8, 9, 10]. We believe that our work,
although different from those cited, is closely connected and combining the results in these cited articles and
the current, we now have quite a few examples of paraconsistent systems obtained by restricting the rules
of inference.
In conclusion, we thus ask the following general questions.
• Is it the case that given a non-paraconsistent logic, we can always expect to obtain a paraconsistent
system by restricting rules of inference similar in nature to MP and HS, in the sense that there is some
loss of information in going from the premises to the conclusion? Will it always be the case that this
restricted logic has the same theorems as the original unrestricted system?
• Moreover, if the original system is sound and complete with respect to a class of algebras A, then the
restricted system is sound and complete with the respect to the class of algebras obtained by attaching
a contaminating element to each member of A?
Following are some other possible directions for future work.
(i) Instead of attaching one extra element, one might investigate the result of attaching finitely many or
even infinitely many extra elements to each member of a class of algebras. These extra elements may
interact differently with the elements of the original algebra. These extra elements may even form
an algebra on their own - in other words, one may investigate the result of gluing an algebra to each
member of a class of algebras. Work in this line has recently been initiated in [9].
(ii) Can we mimic these techniques for logics which do not have Hilbert style presentations? Work in this
line has recently been initiated in [22].
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